Investors' forecasting behavior affects their trading decisions and the resulting asset prices.
Introduction

21
Data and forecasting form the foundations of both long-term planning and operational control. In 22 spite of the widespread use of computers and algorithms to assist with data processing and forecasting, 23 human decision makers continue to affect forecasts in important ways, including the introduction of 24 cognitive biases, strategic biases, and overconfidence into forecasts. For surveys of the impact of human anticipate this price trajectory. In repeated markets as in Haruvy et al. [17] , one reasonable estimator of 146 when the price process peaks is the peak time period in the previous trading run. Consequently, in each 147 trading run the peak occurs earlier than in the previous trading run, and at the same time the size of 148 the bubble decreases as the fundamental value is also larger in earlier periods. This observation leads 149 to the conclusion that learning causes the bubbles to disappear.
150
One question that arises naturally is what happens when investors do not have the opportunity 151 to form expectations using backward induction -e.g. reasoning such as "if it is certain that the price 152 is 0 at the end of period 15, it may not be very high at the end of period 14". Hirota and Sunder
153
[16] considered a setup which makes such backward induction difficult. In their setup, the asset paid a 154 known terminal dividend only at maturity (at the end of 15 or 30 trading periods). In some trading runs, continuous double auction mechanism. In this mechanism, participants announced their bids and asks; at any time any participant could accept a bid or an ask, and the price associated was recorded as the 187 current transaction price. In these studies, the average of the transaction prices was used as a proxy 188 for the market clearing price for that period. On the other hand, researchers such as Haruvy et al. [17] 189 used a call market mechanism. In this mechanism, in each trading period, each participant entered buy 190 and/or sell orders. At the end of the period, all orders were aggregated into market supply and demand 191 curves. An equilibrium price was determined that cleared the market. All feasible trades (bids above 192 the equilibrium price, asks below the equilibrium price) were executed. Bids and asks at the equilibrium 193 price might be only partially executed (in which case, some tie breaking or apportioning mechanism 
202
In our setup, we use a slight modification of the call market mechanism. In each period, each 
207
Orders at the market clearing price are filled completely if the aggregate supply and demand match 208 exactly; in general, the maximum number of orders at the market clearing price are filled, and they are 209 filled in the temporal sequence in which the orders were entered (i.e. on a first-come first-served basis).
210
Some orders can be partially filled.
211
We chose to use this market clearing mechanism primarily to make sure that each period results in 212 a unique equilibrium price. The prices in prior periods are common knowledge to all participants, and 213 we hypothesize that the participants use this information to form price forecasts. wealth at the end of the experiment and the forecast accuracy (if the experiment collected forecast data).
219
Some researchers used a fixed exchange rate (i.e. a pre-announced virtual currency to real currency 220 exchange rate), a pre-announced payment schedule (e.g. for accuracy of predictions), or they divided 221 a pot of money in proportion to the total virtual wealth at the end of the experiment (e.g. Hirota range of dividends that is bigger than the privately communicated actual range of dividends.
243
There are also other specialized objectives to some of these studies. Hirota and Sunder [16] studied 244 the effect of investors' decision horizon on the presence of bubbles and they found that shorter decision 245 horizons (compared with the maturity of the asset) can lead to larger bubbles. Lugovskyy et al. [18] 246 studied the effect of the tâtonnement trading institution on price bubbles and concluded that the 247 participants were able to learn about supply and demand during the tâtonnement process, thereby 248 reducing price bubbles.
249
The goals of our experiments were two-fold: One goal was to collect investors' price forecasts 250 so that various models of investor forecast formation could be calibrated and compared. Another 251 goal was to determine which of the qualitative regimes of asset price trajectories identified in models
252
(convergence of asset prices, cycling of asset prices, or unpredictable asset price trajectories) observed 253 forecasting behavior corresponds to. We conducted these experiments in a setting with endogenous 254 supply and demand, while minimizing the propensity of the participants to sell their assets for lower 255 prices when they think that the experiment is near to completion. 
Some Models of Price Forecast Formation
257
In this section we briefly review a class of models of asset price forecasts and the resulting market clearing prices. Time is indexed by t = 1, 2, . . .. Each unit of asset pays a dividend d t at time t. Let p t denote the price of the asset at time t before the dividend d t has been paid. Letp t+1 denote the investors' forecast at time t of the price at time t + 1. Suppose that the investors in the market are indifferent between investing and not investing in the asset if they expect a rate of return ofr, that does not depend on time. In each time period, investors can rebalance their portfolios without transaction cost, and they forecast only one period into the future. Then the indifference price at time t is
In the experimental sessions we conducted, the dividend process was revealed to everyone, 
Extrapolation-Correction Models of Forecast Formation
266
The model given here is an adaptation of the more generic model given in Cheriyan and Kleywegt
267
[12]. We consider forecasts that depend on both observed data as well as the fundamental value, as 268 explained in the next four subsections.
269
It is convenient to consider the prices and forecasts scaled by the fundamental value, as follows:
Let y t denote the growth rate of scaled prices in period t, that is,
The extrapolation forecastŷ t of the price growth rate is given bŷ
whereŷ 2 is an appropriate initial value. Thus, the extrapolation forecast is given by the exponential smoothing forecast. Note that α corresponds to the weight the investor gives to the most recent price ratio. If the forecaster used only the extrapolation forecast, then the corresponding scaled forecast for the price at time t + 1 would beπ
Note that at time t, (p 1 , . . . , p t−1 ) are known to the investor. The price p t is yet to be realized and will 272 depend on the buy and sell orders of the investor. 
wherep t is the fundamental value at time t, and b 0 and b 1 are constants. Thus, the forecasts are linear 292 functions of the deviations of the past price from the fundamental value. 
Design of the Behavioral Experiment
294
Our experiment consisted of three sessions of a virtual asset market with a discrete-time trading 295 mechanism, as given in Process Flow 1. including the value of the stopping probability, in advance of each trading run.
Process
306
Unlike traditional classroom experiments that last 1 or 2 hours, we set up our sessions to last for 307 three and a half to four hours. Thus, at least during the initial part of the session, the participants did 308 not consider the end of the session when making their trading decisions.
309
We also instituted a salvage value of 100 Experimental Currency Units (ECUs) for each unit of asset
310
held when the trading run ended. Theoretically, this just adds a constant to the fundamental value of 311 the asset. We decided to add the salvage value after an initial trial run of the experiment (the data from 312 the trial run were not used) to reduce the fixation of some participants on the possibility that the asset 313 may become worthless at any time. 
Dividend Structure
315
In each period, a dividend was paid for each unit of asset held. The dividend was added to the 316 cash-on-hand of each participant.
317
For the first two sessions, the dividend was fixed to 10 ECUs per unit of asset in each period. For the third session, the dividends were the same for all participants but were random for each period. In each period the market was in a state X t ∈ {low, high}. The state transition followed a discrete time Markov chain with the transition matrix
The initial state, X 1 , was chosen at random with equal probability. The dividend D t for each period had 318 a distribution depending on X t as given in Table 1 . Table 1 . Conditional probability mass function for the dividends. runs, and post-session debriefing.
323
The overview included an explanation of the Process Flow 1, probabilistic stopping of trading runs 324 including the memoryless property of the geometric distribution, the dividend process, the concept of 325 fundamental value and its calculation, the process for placing buy and sell orders, and the market probability for all trading runs was 1/50 and this was announced to the participants.
330
The training trading run lasted four periods. The purpose of the training trading run was to 
346
In each period each participant had to enter answers to the following questions:
347
• The expected number of time periods remaining in the trading run.
348
• The expected total dividends paid by one unit of asset from the current period until the end of the 349 trading run.
350
• The total of the expected dividend from the current period until the end of the trading run and 351 the salvage value for one unit of asset held until the end of the trading run.
352
• The participant's forecast of the price per unit of asset.
353
• The current state of the market (only session 3 -Markov dividend case).
After they entered the feedback and forecast information, the order entry portion of the screen 355 was enabled and they could enter multiple buy or sell orders. Participants could also not trade in a 356 period, however, the software design enforced that there would be at least one order entered among 357 all participants in every period. This was required to ensure that there is an equilibrium price in every
358
period.
359
Once a participant made her entries, a wait screen was displayed. After all participants made their 360 entries, the market was cleared based on the orders and the new equilibrium price was determined.
361
Subsequent periods followed the same pattern until the computer determined that the trading run 362 was over.
363
At the end of the trading run, the participants' portfolios were converted into virtual currency.
364
Then, the winners were determined and were announced.
365
Finally, there was a short debrief session where we gathered feedback from the participants about 366 the session.
367
The specific details of the experimental sessions are given in Table 2 . Rather than provide a fixed participation fee to each participant, three prizes were awarded at the 370 end of each experimental session. 2. The participant with the largest final amount of virtual currency received a prize of $100.
374
3. The participant with the smallest mean square forecast error received a prize of $100.
375
The motivation for this incentive scheme is as follows. Other behavioral experiments have shown that the selection process has already happened. Thus, in our case, the participants would be looking at 383 an amount of the order of $150, which is lucrative. Also, random selection of two participants helped 384 avoid participants dropping out of the experiment if they are doing poorly.
385
The prize for the largest portfolio incentivized playing the game strategically and thoughtfully and 386 the prize for the smallest forecast error incentivized careful forecasting and reporting of forecasts.
Our incentive structure is somewhat unconventional. Our incentive structure is such that the risk 388 faced by a participant who invests in the virtual "risky" asset is not the same as the risk that an investor 389 would have faced if the market were real and the investor invested in an asset with the same dividends.
390
Of course, the risk faced by a participant who invests in the virtual risky asset affects the price that 391 the participant is willing to virtually pay for the asset during an experiment. Also, rewarding the 392 participant with the largest virtual wealth at the end of a session disproportionately creates tournament 393 incentives that may also affect the price that the participant is willing to virtually pay for the asset 394 during an experiment. When making these observations, it is important to keep in mind that the 395 purpose of the study was to model investor forecast formation and not price formation in a market. Computational Finance -QCF) programs. We chose to include only Masters or Ph.D. students to 399 ensure that they had sufficient background knowledge of basic probability. Basics of asset valuation, 400 discounted cash flow, and the memoryless property of the geometric distribution were explained to all 401 the participants during the overview session.
402
All subjects gave their informed consent for inclusion before they participated in the study. The 
Summary of Observations
406
Though the first session had two trading runs, the second trading run did not complete within the 407 time allotted for that session. So we used only the completed trading run for data fitting. There was 408 only one trading run per session for the remaining two sessions. Therefore, from here on we will use 409 the terms session and trading run interchangeably. 
Equilibrium Price
411
Since in each period, the trading run could end with a stopping probability of 1/50, the number of time periods T was Geometric with parameter p = 1/50. The expected total returns for one unit of stock can be computed asp
where d t is the dividend at period t. For sessions 1 and 2, the fundamental value was constant 412 throughout and equaled 600 ECUs. For session 3, the computation of fundamental value is given in 413 Appendix A. For session 3, the fundamental value at the beginning of the trading run was also 600
414
ECUs.
415 Figure 1 shows the realized equilibrium prices for the three sessions. Sessions 1 and 2 had 416 prominent price cycles whereas session 3 had milder price cycles.
417
In all three sessions, the prices started from well below the fundamental value and started In each period, each participant was required to enter a price forecast for that period. Recall that 429 the market clearing price in a period was determined only after the buy and sell orders were processed. price.
433
The forecasts in the initial few periods are interesting. It seems that some of the participants started 
Earning Forecasts
438
As part of the initial survey, each participant was asked the following question:
439
Given the compensation rules and the number of participants, how much money do you 440 think you will earn in this experiment?
441 The data used for model calibration are the equilibrium prices and the participants' forecasts from 450 the three sessions
451
First, we cleaned the data by fixing obvious typographical errors. Typically, the error was omission 452 of the decimal point.
453
In the initial few periods of each of the three sessions, the equilibrium price increased from a value 454 much lower than the fundamental value. A possible explanation is that the participants were trying 455 to learn how the rest of the participants would behave. However, the models that we wanted to fit 456 with the data were not intended to capture such initial learning or adaptation. Consequently, we used 457 a subset of the data when the initial effect had passed. Moreover, we wanted to choose a subset of the 458 data in a way that is endogenous to the data itself and not dependent on the model that we fit. To 459 achieve this, we used the following approach: In the equilibrium price chart, let p 0 be the price in the 460 first price trough. We discarded the data from the initial periods during which the price was smaller 461 than p 0 . According to this approach, the number of dropped periods for the three sessions was between 462 7 and 11. Finally, to use the same number for all three sessions, we simply discarded the data from the 463 first 10 periods in each session.
464
We also checked this approach using the calibrated models with the quadratic H function given in 465 Section 6.3.5. We calibrated a sequence of models by successively dropping more initial periods from 466 the data set. We observed that the fitted parameter values stabilized by the time we dropped the first 467 10 periods' data.
468
In addition, for session 3, we dropped the data from period 56 onwards. This was done to avoid 469 the effects of the spike that occurred in period 56. Consider a family of models of forecast formation represented as
where γ denotes the vector of parameters of the model and ε j are i.i.d. N(0, σ 2 ) random variables.
The parameter fit for participant u in session σ is given bŷ
The parameter fit using all data in all sessions is given bŷ LOOCV RMSE for a participant is computed as follows.
488
Letγ −i (σ, u) denote the vector of parameters fitted for the participant u in session σ after dropping the data for period i. That is,
Then, the leave-one-period-out LOOCV RMSE of the model ψ for the participant is given by
The leave-one-period-out LOOCV coefficient of variation is the leave-one-period-out LOOCV RMSE scaled by the fundamental value, given by
Leave-One-Session-Out LOOCV
489
In this case, one set of parameters are fit for all participants and all periods in all sessions but 490 one (thus in two sessions). The fitted model is then used to calculate forecasts for all particpants and 491 all periods in the omitted session. The resulting RMSE gives a measure of predictability if a common 492 model is fitted for all sessions and participants.
493
The leave-one-session-out LOOCV RMSE is computed as follows. Letγ −s denote the vector of parameters fitted after dropping all observations in session s. That is,
Then, the leave-one-session-out LOOCV RMSE is given by
The leave-one-session-out LOOCV coefficient of variation is the leave-one-session-out LOOCV RMSE scaled by the fundamental value, given by
Comparison of Fitted Models
495
We fit various models with the data. The individual models are covered in subsequent sections; 496 the key parameters of these models are given in Table 4 .
497
The model BASE is the pure rational expectations model -according to the rational expectations 498 model, the participant's forecast equals the fundamental value (also recall that the participants were 499 told the fundamental value in each period). Note that model BASE has no parameters to be fitted.
500
Next we consider two one-parameter models. Table 5 gives the leave-one-period-out LOOCV RMSE for each session. Model F is similar to BASE, except that a parameter representing "perceived fundamental value" is now fitted with data.
511
wheref is the parameter to be fitted.
514 Table 6 gives the leave-one-period-out LOOCV RMSE for each session. Model ES uses simple exponential smoothing with initial price ratio of 1.
515
. . , n y 2 := 1 Table 7 gives the leave-one-period-out LOOCV RMSE for each session. 
Note that the forecast in period t + 1 is a linear function of the price in period t − 1. However, in our experiment, at the beginning of period t, the participants entered the price forecast for that period.
Therefore, we modify the BH model tô The correction function is given by
In this case, the model function ψ j is given by
There are four parameters: very little effect on the objective. Therefore, y 2 was fixed at 1 and the remaining three parameters were 532 estimated by minimizing the sum of squared errors. Table 9 gives the leave-one-period-out LOOCV RMSE for each session.
538
The leave-one-session-out LOOCV RMSE is The correction function is given by
The structure of the H function was chosen so that when ρ ∈ [0, 1], then H is increasing and when ρ < 0, 542 then H is non-monotonic. Thus, a fitted value of ρ that is negative would indicate that the participant 543 exhibits panicking behavior. Also, the parameter η is such that H (1) = 2η.
544 Figure 4 shows members of this family of functions H. In order to be consistent with fitting the ESH2 model, the y 2 parameter was fixed to 1. We used Table 10 gives the leave-one-period-out LOOCV RMSE for each session. It is also interesting to note that fitting a single set of parameters to all the participants in all the 556 sessions gave an RMSE = 16.07 with the corresponding CV of 2.68%. Thus, the behavior of the group 557 can be described fairly well by a single set of parameters. BH, ESH2, ESHE only, that is, leaving out the two worst performing models BASE and F.
554
566
The leave-one-session-out LOOCV RMSE of the various models are given in Table 11 . As is 567 the case for the leave-one-period-out LOOCV RMSE, the rational expectations model (BASE) has the 568 highest leave-one-session-out LOOCV RMSE, and model F has slightly smaller leave-one-session-out 569 LOOCV RMSE. It can be seen that an exponential smoothing model with a single parameter for 570 all sessions and all participants captures much of the variation in the observed forecasts. More 
Interpretation and Implications of Results
574
In Cheriyan and Kleywegt [12] the dynamical system associated with the price process was studied 575 both analytically and numerically. It was shown there that the qualitative behavior of the trajectories of 576 this dynamical system is determined by the parameter α and the nature of the H function. These can 577 also be related to the investors' behavioral characteristics. Although the purpose of our experiment was 578 to calibrate models of investor forecasting behavior and not to calibrate the dynamical system itself, in 579 this section we make observations regarding the fitted models of investor forecasting behavior and the 580 qualitative behavior of the dynamical system.
The parameter α captures the investors' memory -the weight that they put on the most recent observed price ratio. Given an H function and a fundamental dividend to price ratio δ (or price-earnings ratio 1/δ), a critical value of α is given by 
Conclusions
614
We designed an experiment to study investors' price forecast formation in the context of a market
615
for an investment asset. Many experiments in the literature use trading runs with a pre-announced with discounting by stopping the trading run in each period with a pre-announced stopping probability.
620
We conducted three experimental sessions with one trading run each. The equilibrium prices in all three 621 trading runs exhibited cycles.
622
We fit a number of models of expectation formation to the data. The fit for the rational base case provided a slightly better fit. Moreover, it can be shown that these models are able to explain price 632 cycles and more complex price trajectories in addition to price bubbles, see Cheriyan and Kleywegt
633
[12] for details. For every participant, the fitted value of α was larger than the critical value α * for the 634 associated dynamical system, which is consistent with the price cycles observed in the sessions. The 635 parameter fits also indicated some amount of overconfidence. The data did not provide evidence of 636 panicking behavior.
637
An interesting observation was the gap between theoretical knowledge and internalized 638 knowledge. For example, based on correct answers to questions before the experiment, we concluded Recall that in each period of the market, trades are made first and then the dividend is paid out.
694
The dividend for each time period is a constant d. If the realization of a Geometric(p) random variable 695 is a success, the salvage value s is paid out for each unit of stock held, otherwise, a new period starts.
696
Algorithm 1 gives the details of the market algorithm for this case. Since the actual duration of the 697 experiment is of the order of hours, we assume the discount factor is 0. 
Proof. Let ξ t be the random variable that is 1 if the market is running in period t and is 0 otherwise. Then {ξ t } ∞ t=1 is a sequence of iid Bernouilli(1 − p) random variables. Let D t be the dividend in period t. We have that
Note that if any of the ξ i 's are zero, then the entire expression is zero, this automatically captures the fact that if the market stops in period i, then for t ≥ i, D t = 0. Also, for the present period, we know that the dividend is certain to be d, that is
The dividend stream at period t is given by
Therefore,
which is independent of t. Since a unit of stock held for ever necessarily will result in a final payout of s, and since the discount factor is 0, the fundamental value of a unit of stock is given by In the case of Markov Dividends, the support of the dividend distribution in a period t depends 708 on the market state in that period. The market states X t ∈ {1, 2} evolve according to a Markov chain 709 with transition matrix P. Let π denote the stationary distribution corresponding to transition matrix P.
710
In our experiment, the initial state X 0 was drawn from the distribution π.
711
Let the matrix Q denote the conditional p.m.f. for the dividend q ij = P(d t = j|X t = i) and
712
Algorithm 2 gives the details of the market algorithm in the case of Markov dividends.
Algorithm 2 Market Algorithm with Deterministic Constant Dividend
Given:
• p, the stopping probability • π, the initial probability distribution for market state • P = [p ij ], the state transition matrix for the Markov chain; p ij = P(X t = j|X t−1 = i)
• Q = [q ij ], the dividend distribution; q ij = P(d t = j|X t = i) Algorithm:
1 718 Letν x,t (d t ) = P(X t+1 = x|d t ). That is,ν x,t (d t ) is the estimate at the end of period t (i.e. beginning 719 of period t + 1) that the probability of the state X t+1 will be x ∈ {1, 2, }. Letν t (d t ) = [ν 1,t (d t ),ν 2,t (d t )].
720
In each period, the investor updatesv t and uses it to compute the fundamental value for the next period.
721
The estimate of the probability distribution of the state is given by 
